Constitutional Limitations on Closing the Gender Gap in Employment by McCormick, Marcia L.
FIU Law Review 
Volume 8 Number 2 Article 11 
Spring 2013 
Constitutional Limitations on Closing the Gender Gap in 
Employment 
Marcia L. McCormick 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Other Law Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Marcia L. McCormick, Constitutional Limitations on Closing the Gender Gap in Employment, 8 FIU L. Rev. 
405 (2013). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU 
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
405 
Constitutional Limitations on Closing the Gender Gap 
in Employment 
Marcia L. McCormick* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although discrimination on the basis of sex in employment and 
education has been prohibited for over forty years, essentially two 
generations, women lag behind men in workplace achievement by 
almost every measure.  The most prestigious and well-paying jobs con-
tinue to be held predominantly by men, and at nearly every level, 
women’s pay is less than men’s pay.  When race is also taken into ac-
count, the disparities are shocking.  And at least some gap remains 
when every variable but sex is controlled for.  Study after study has 
attempted to measure the cause of these disparities, finding some ex-
planatory value in the number of hours worked, consistent attachment 
to the workplace, and gender segregation in the labor market.  These 
three factors have been attributed to choices women have made, and 
thus, as not a proper subject for law or government programs to ad-
dress. Even accounting for those factors, however, persistent pay and 
achievement gaps remain that can only be explained by sex discrimi-
nation – in other words, that employers are considering sex when they 
make decisions that affect hiring, promotion, or pay.  
Regardless of the reasons, the legal structures we have employed 
have not worked to eliminate this achievement gap.  And just at a time 
when we might want to consider new ways to approach it, the Su-
preme Court, in cases such as Ricci v. DeStefano, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 
Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, and Na-
tional Federation of International Businesses v. Sebelius, is suggesting 
that the Constitution may impose limits on how we might use the law 
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to do so.  The Court in these cases redefines discrimination, suggests 
that the Equal Protection Clause may impose limits on Congress’s 
ability to legislate something other than traditional formal equality, 
signals restrictions on judicial enforcement of constitutional and statu-
tory rights, and suggests new limits for Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause.  This paper explores the ways that the Court has 
slowly been retracting our ability to address the underlying causes of 
the achievement gap through the law or federal programs. 
Part II addresses the gender gap and summarizes the approach 
federal law takes to narrow it.  Part III traces the constitutional devel-
opments that have slowly eroded government’s power to address ine-
quality.  Part IV identifies potential worrying trends from cases that 
are not employment law cases, but which nonetheless might worry the 
labor and employment community.  Part V concludes this article. 
II. THE GAP AND LEGAL APPROACHES TO NARROW IT 
There are many different gaps between men and women that 
have remained rather persistent over time.  There is a gap in pay,1 in 
workplace attainment or vertical integration within and across firms,2 
in wealth,3 and in socio-economic status.4  Congress has mainly tried to 
remedy these gaps between the sexes in two ways: through antidis-
crimination legislation, or through Spending Clause statutes with con-
tract-like conditions.  The best known examples of antidiscrimination 
legislation include the Equal Pay Act, which prohibited sex discrimi-
                                                                                                                           
 1 JODY FEDER & LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PAY EQUITY LEGISLATION 1 
(2010), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1768&conte 
xt=key_workplace  (according to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2008 full-time working women had 
a median annual salary of $ 35,745, while men had a median salary of $ 46,367). 
 2 See, e.g., Nancy M. Carter & Christine Silva, Women in Management: Delusions of Pro-
gress, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2010, at 19 (summarizing a study of women in management and 
finding that among graduates of elite MBA programs, “women continue to lag men at every 
single career stage, right from their first professional jobs”). 
 3 See generally MARIKO LIN CHANG, SHORTCHANGED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS 
WEALTH AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2010) (documenting the wealth gap that women 
own about thirty-six cents for every dollar of wealth owned by men and exploring the causes). 
 4 See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, 15 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf (reporting that women were more likely than 
men to live in poverty and the difference increased with age); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 2 (2010), available 
at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2010.pdf (reporting that about the same number of men 
and women in the labor force lived in poverty, but that women made up a significantly greater 
proportion of the working poor); see also WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN AND GIRLS, 
WOMEN IN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/Women_in_America.pdf.  
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nation in pay for equal work;5 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,6 which prohibited discrimination in terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment or classification that would tend to deprive 
workers of employment opportunities on the basis of sex and other 
identity characteristics.   
Spending Clause statutes use contract-like conditions.  For exam-
ple, they require recipients of federal funds to not discriminate on the 
basis of sex, or else risk losing the funds.  One example of this kind of 
statute in the discrimination context is the Patsy T. Mink Equal Op-
portunity in Education Act, popularly known as Title IX, which pro-
hibits sex discrimination and applies to educational institutions that 
receive federal funds.7  Conditions are also imposed on those indi-
viduals or institutions the federal government contracts with by an 
Executive Order that prohibits contractors from discriminating on the 
basis of sex.8 The reason that an Executive Order acts like the Spend-
ing Clause here is because the contracts are funded in the first place 
through Spending Clause legislation. 
These efforts have had some success, but it is not clear that they 
have been responsible for narrowing the gender gaps.  For example, 
the pay gap in the United States was essentially unchanged for the 
first twenty years after enactment of the first federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes.9  The pay gap did narrow in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
but progress seems to have stalled since then.10  The beginning of the 
narrowing is not linked to any legislative or executive branch change, 
and in fact occurred more than a decade after the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was given enforcement power.  
Clearly, something else was at work. 
Intertwined with the persistence of the gaps is broad horizontal 
sex segregation in the workforce: women and men tend to do different 
jobs, sometimes with differences in hours, and sometimes garnering 
                                                                                                                           
 5 The Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 209, 211, 213, 215–19, 255–56, 259–60, 262 (2006)).   
 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)).  Parts of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 focused on entities that ac-
cepted federal funds rather than all private entities. 
 7 The Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2006)). 
 8 Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Dec. 12, 2002).  This Executive Order is 
enforced by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. 
 9 See Mark R. Killingsworth, Comparable Worth and Pay Equity: Recent Developments in 
the United States, 28 CAN. PUB. POL’Y S171, S173-75 (2002). 
 10 Id.; see also Leslie McCall & Christine Percheski, Income Inequality: New Trends and 
Research Directions, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 329 (2010). 
408 FIU Law Review [8:405 
different pay.11  Some pink collar jobs pay relatively well.  In the pro-
fessional category of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ occupational clas-
sifications, 82% of elementary and middle school teachers are women, 
with median weekly earnings of $891.12  But even within this occupa-
tional category, men have higher median wages at $1040 per week.13  
Moreover, complicating this fact of horizontal sex segregation are 
gendered divisions of labor within families headed by heterosexual 
parent couples.  When family friendly policies are introduced, they 
tend to reinforce this gendered division of labor and the horizontal 
sex segregation, therefore stalling progress on shrinking these gaps.14 
Because just using law to prohibit discrimination does not seem 
to be resolving sex inequality,15 we might wish to use other public pol-
icy tools to supplement that effort.  However, the Supreme Court in 
recent years has made that more difficult.  The next section traces the 
way the Court has viewed the power of government to regulate the 
workplace.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTION 
A. First, the Expansion 
Significant regulation of employment coincides generally with the 
Second Industrial Revolution.  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
work was increasingly dangerous.16  Activists of this era sought to im-
prove wages, hours, and working conditions for all workers.  At first, 
these activists had success with small pieces of legislation by industry, 
sex, or age of the worker.17  These gains were frustrated by the Su-
preme Court in the now infamous case of Lochner v. New York, in 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Maria Charles, A World of Difference: International Trends in Women’s Economic 
Status, 37 ANN. REV. SOC. 355 (2011); Nan Weiner, Effective Redress of Pay Inequities, 28 CAN. 
PUB. POL’Y S101, S103 (2002). 
 12 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 30 tbl. 11, 57 tbl. 18. 
 13 Id. at 57 tbl. 18. 
 14 See generally John M. Evans, Work/Family Reconciliation, Gender Wage Equity and 
Occupational Segregation: The Role of Firms and Public Policy, 28 CAN. PUB. POL’Y S187 (2002). 
 15 See Mark Cassidy et al., Gender Pay Differentials and Equality Legislation in the Repub-
lic of Ireland, 28 CAN. PUB. POL’Y S149 (2002); Weiner, supra note 11, at S102-03. 
 16 See generally WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (1995); Arthur F. McEvoy, 
The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911: Social Change, Industrial Accidents, and the Evolu-
tion of Commonsense Causality, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 621, 629-30, 641-43 (1995). 
 17 See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING WOMEN 
IN THE UNITED STATES 186-99, 203 (1983) (describing a number of laws that limited the types of 
jobs, number of working hours, or amount of wages for women and sometimes minors).  A de-
scription of other types of protective legislation appears in the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Examples are the New York statute at issue in that case 
limiting hours of labor in bakeries, id. at 46, and a Utah law limiting the hours of miners, id. at 
54–55. 
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which the Court struck down maximum hours legislation for bakers as 
a violation of the freedom to contract.18  The Court had previously 
allowed such protections for workers in particularly dangerous occu-
pations, but not for the average adult worker.19  
The Great Depression and New Deal provided the impetus for 
enacting substantially more protective labor legislation.  The first such 
statute was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which pro-
vided a system for labor to bargain collectively, promoted sector-wide 
bargaining, covered wages and hours, and covered working conditions 
in some industries.20  The Supreme Court struck that down, in part, 
because it delegated legislative authority to the Executive Branch.21  
Shortly after, President Roosevelt proposed expanding the size of the 
Court to pack it with justices that supported the New Deal.22  That leg-
islation was not successful, and the Court switched its position on the 
strength of the freedom to contract by upholding state minimum wage 
legislation for adults as constitutional.23  Additional New Deal legisla-
tion was all upheld.  The Wagner Act, which later became the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), gave workers the right to bargain col-
lectively over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment.24  The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) set a minimum 
wage and mandated extra pay for hours worked over a weekly thresh-
old for many workers.25  Although worker injuries were not addressed 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45, 57-63 (1905). 
 19 Id. at 54-55, 58-59 (noting that protections for workers in underground mines and smelt-
ing operations and coal workers had been upheld in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), and 
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (1901), on the grounds that those occupations were 
dangerous to the health of workers).  The Court in Lochner suggested that the prior cases pre-
sented two justifications for the legitimate use of the police power of the state to limit the hours 
of work a person could do: (1) if the members of the class suffered from a disability that made 
them less able to protect their own interests; and (2) if the work to be done was unusually dan-
gerous.  Id. at 57-62.  In Lochner, the Court proposed a third potential ground – injuries to the 
public caused through demands on those workers.  Id. at 57, 62-63. 
 20 The National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).  
 21 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 22 See generally MARIAN CECILIA MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT 
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 (2002). 
 23 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  Many historians have argued that the 
policy switch was made to avoid Roosevelt’s court packing plan, but others contest that argu-
ment, arguing instead that the plan was dead before the policy switch.  See Richard H. Pildes, Is 
the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103 (2011). 
 24 The National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006)).  The act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 25 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006)).  The Fair Labor Standards Act was upheld in United 
States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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comprehensively by the federal government,26 most states enacted 
workers’ compensation systems to provide wage insurance and pay-
ment of medical bills for workers injured or killed on the job.27  The 
federal Social Security Act created a system of retirement, unem-
ployment insurance, and welfare benefits for poor families and people 
with disabilities.28   
The years surrounding World War II and the early days of the 
Cold War saw little legislative action on workplace laws,29 but the civil 
rights movement and other movements for workers in the depths of 
the Cold War created support for a flood of new regulation. In the 
1960s and 1970s, several statutes were enacted: the Equal Pay Act,30 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,31 the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act,32 the Occupational Safety and Health Act,33 Title IX, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act,34 the Rehabilitation Act,35 and the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.36  About a decade later, a new set of 
workplace legislation was enacted: the Americans with Disabilities 
Act37 and the Family and Medical Leave Act.38  Since then, there have 
been some amendments to existing laws, but no new civil rights legis-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Federal law did address injuries of some employees, such as those who worked for rail-
roads or on ships, for example.  Federal Employers Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codi-
fied as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006)) (governing railroads); Merchant Marine Act of 
1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006)). 
 27 E.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 13-g (McKinney 2011).  New York’s Workers’ Com-
pensation Law, enacted in 1911, struck down and enacted in a slightly different form in 1914, was 
a product of the Wainwright Commission’s findings after the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire.  
PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 11-13 (1998). When 
the Supreme Court upheld New York’s law in N.Y. Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916), 
along with similar laws from Iowa, Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917), and Washington, 
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917), other states quickly enacted their own 
such laws; forty-two states by 1920, and all states by 1949.  See also John Fabian Witt, Note, The 
Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467 
(1998). 
 28 The Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34 (2006)).  The Supreme Court upheld the Social Security Act in a series of 
cases: Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (interpreting the general welfare spending clause); 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (concerning unemployment insurance); Car-
michael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (involving unemployment insurance). 
 29 One notable exception was the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, applying new rules to unions. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 
Stat. 136 (1947). 
 30 The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). 
 31 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 32 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602. 
 33 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. 
 34 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. 
 35 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355. 
 36 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 37 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327. 
 38 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6. 
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lation.39  The biggest workplace development has come through the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act40 and the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.41 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the most sweeping of these Acts, 
was challenged on the grounds that Congress could not require pri-
vate parties to stop discriminating.  The challengers focused on the 
public accommodations provisions and claimed that the statute ex-
ceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power and deprived them of 
liberty and property without due process.42  The Court rejected that 
claim in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, holding that the 
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to prohibit private race dis-
crimination.43  After Heart of Atlanta Motel, Congress’s power to enact 
Title VII was mostly settled, although its reach and the anti-
discrimination principle embodied by the Equal Protection Clause 
were litigated.44  There was no hint at that time that prohibiting dis-
criminatory effects would pose a constitutional problem, and in fact, 
the Court seemingly approved of such a rule, but thought Congress 
should be the body to create it: “extension of the [disparate impact] 
rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Congress extended family and medical leave to members of the military and their fami-
lies and to flight crews.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-84, § 565, 123 Stat. 2190, 2309 (2009).  It also provided whistleblower protections for employ-
ees reporting fraud in the financial sector.  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 297-302 (providing whistleblower protection and prohib-
iting mandatory employment arbitration provisions).  Finally, it amended Title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act to clarify that pay discrimination occurs with each paycheck that provides less pay on 
the basis of sex.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. III 2009)). 
 40 Congress required larger employers to provide affordable health insurance for employ-
ees or pay a tax, created incentives for smaller employers to provide health insurance, and also 
mandated breaks and facilities for lactating women to express milk.  Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 41 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 
748, 922-24, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739-46, 1841-50 (2010). 
 42 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). 
 43 Id. at 257-58, 261 (considering a challenge to the public accommodations provision of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 44 One big question was whether state action that had discriminatory effects (rather than 
that taken with intent to discriminate) was prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.  Most 
courts answered in the affirmative, but the Supreme Court rejected that possibility.  See Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243-45 (1976) (detailing Supreme Court cases that seemed to recognize 
that and the extent of agreement among the courts of appeals).  Justice Stevens, concurring, did 
suggest that discriminatory impact might sometimes show a violation of equal protection, not 
because it clearly showed a subjective motivation, but because people are presumed to intend 
the natural consequences of their actions.  Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Pers. Adm’r 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (despite usual rule of intending natural consequences, no 
evidence that veteran’s preference was adopted because it kept women out of positions); Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that discriminatory purpose could be inferred from 
denial of permit to all Chinese applicants and grant to about 98% of non-Chinese applicants).   
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statute, such as in the field of public employment, should await legisla-
tive prescription.”45 
B. The Contraction 
Even as Congress was expanding rights through statutes, the 
Court began to limit Congress’s power to do so.  Limits began with the 
Tenth Amendment in National League of Cities v. Usery,46 which con-
cerned the application of the FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum 
hours rules to state and local governments.  The Court analyzed the 
issue as a clash between Congress’s Commerce Clause power and the 
right states have to continue to exist as sovereigns, which is a right 
recognized by the Tenth Amendment.47  The National League of Cities 
test proved unworkable, and the Court overruled it in 1985 in Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.48  But only a few years 
after Garcia, the Court began to strengthen the Tenth Amendment 
again, holding that it prohibited a federal court from ordering a state 
to raise property taxes to adequately fund a school system as a rem-
edy for discrimination the school district had engaged in.49  The princi-
ple was further developed to prohibit Congress from coercing state 
governments into either accepting ownership of radioactive waste or 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. 
 46 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 47 Id. at 840-52.  The Court refined the test for when federal statutes would violate the 
Tenth Amendment in Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).  
The federal statute at issue must regulate “the States as States,” it must regulate what are clearly 
“attribute[s] of state sovereignty,” state compliance with the federal statute must “directly impair 
[the States’] ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions,’” and the federal interest at stake must not be one that “justifies state submission.”  Hodel, 
452 U.S. at 287-88, & n.29 (quoting Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845, 852, 854). 
 48 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).  Because the nature of 
government had changed in the course of history, relying on history and tradition to delineate 
the boundaries of the rule provided a moving target.  Id. at 543-45.  And state government 
should be allowed to change within the limits of the U.S. Constitution in order to maximize the 
power of state citizens to shape the form of their government through the political process. Id. at 
545-46.  Finally, the Court theorized that the states had adequate structural protection from 
congressional overreaching as evidenced by the fact that the states remained immune from 
obligations under a number of federal statutes and the fact that the states had secured compen-
sation in the form of federal funding for many programs at the same time any obligations were 
imposed.  Id. at 552-55.  Thus, both pragmatism and federalism required that National League of 
Cities be overruled. 
 49 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).  The Court further held that a federal court could 
have allowed or required the school district to levy property taxes at a rate adequate to fund the 
desegregation remedy, and it could have enjoined the operation of state laws that would have 
prevented the district from exercising this power.  The distinction between what was prohibited 
and allowed may seem a fine one. 
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implementing legislation dictated by Congress,50 and to prohibit Con-
gress from requiring local law enforcement to conduct background 
checks on applicants for gun permits.51  This anti-commandeering prin-
ciple was seen as a way to protect the political system: if average peo-
ple could not tell what government was responsible for legislation 
they either liked or disliked, they would not be able to engage the 
right political system to respond.52 
The Court also limited Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause during this period. In 1995, the Court struck down legislation 
as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power in United States v. Lo-
pez, which concerned a statute that made possession of a firearm in a 
school zone a federal crime.53  The Court found that criminalizing gun 
possession near schools was not regulation of any sort of economic 
activity, nor did gun possession in a school zone, by itself, substantially 
affect interstate commerce.54  Following Lopez, the Court struck down 
the civil remedy in the Violence Against Women Act, holding that 
gender-motivated violence was neither economic activity itself, nor did 
such violence substantially affect interstate commerce.55  After Morri-
son, in Gonzales v. Raich,56 the Court upheld the federal Controlled 
Substances Act57 as valid Commerce Clause legislation that preempted 
a California law which had allowed individuals to grow small amounts 
of marijuana for their own use when a doctor recommended the drug 
for serious medical conditions.58   
The Court avoided the federalism issue entirely in a case involv-
ing the executive branch’s attempts to preempt an Oregon law that 
allowed doctors to prescribe drugs to help terminally ill patients 
commit suicide,59 by finding that Congress failed to give the executive 
                                                                                                                           
 50 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (prohibiting Congress from re-
quiring state governments to accept ownership of radioactive waste or implement legislation 
dictated by Congress). 
 51 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-33 (1997) (prohibiting Congress from comman-
deering local law enforcement). 
 52 See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. 
 53 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (considering the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990), superseded by statute, 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 
Stat. 1796, 2125-26 (1994); see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 
1, 2-3 (2004).   
 54 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-68. 
 55 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (considering the Violence against Women 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941-42 (1994)).  
 56 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12-22 (2005). 
 57 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2006). 
 58 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West  2012). 
 59 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800-.897 (West  1998). 
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branch the power to prohibit doctors from prescribing these drugs.60  
Most recently, though, the Court held that Congress lacked power 
under the Commerce Clause to mandate that individuals buy health 
insurance, rejecting the government’s argument that health care was a 
market everyone participated in already.61  
Despite Raich, when taken together, these cases make fairly clear 
that the Commerce Clause can only reach commercial activity or ac-
tivity that relates to goods or services that might travel in commerce.  
To the extent that the gender pay gap is caused at least in part by gen-
der segregation in the labor force, and that gender segregation de-
pends in part on constraints related to family, the Commerce Clause 
may not provide a source of power to remedy it.  In other words, the 
Commerce Clause may not support legislation that relates to family 
relationships and the division of caregiving responsibilities. 
In addition to the Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause con-
texts, the Court has put limits on the power of Congress, the Executive 
Branch, and the states under the Equal Protection principles of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the limits 
began in the context of affirmative action.  Through a series of cases, 
the Court held that any consideration of race, even to benefit histori-
cally disadvantaged groups, received the same scrutiny as considera-
tions to harm those groups.62   
This shift to limit Congress’s power was invigorated in 1996 in a 
series of cases on the Eleventh Amendment.  In Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida,63 the Court held that Congress could not subject the states to 
suits by private parties when it acted under its Commerce Clause 
power, but could only do so under its Fourteenth Amendment pow-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257-69 (2006). 
 61 Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 62 The series began with Wygant v. Jackson Bd of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (plural-
ity op.); id. at 285 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 295 
(White, J., concurring in the judgment only).  In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court 
struck down an affirmative action plan the city was requiring its contractors to agree to that 
involved minority set-asides for subcontractors, and a majority of justices finally agreed that 
strict scrutiny should apply.  488 U.S. 469, 493, 508 (1989); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The 
plurality rested its decision in part on the fact that a city council lacked the powers expressly 
given to Congress in the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the equal protection guarantees.  Id. 
at 488, 490.  In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s 
equal protection guarantee should be made identical to the Fourteenth Amendment’s.  515 U.S. 
200, 227 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).  
 63 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  The plain language of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits “in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or . . . of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend XI.  In Hans v. Louisiana, 10 S. Ct. 504 
(1890), the Court read more into that language, holding that it prohibited suits in federal courts 
not only by citizens of foreign states but also by a citizen against his or her own state. 
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ers.64  The result in Seminole Tribe left intact a decision that had upheld 
Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment as validly within the 
Court’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.65  But Con-
gress’s power under the Fourteenth Amendment became more impor-
tant the year after the Seminole Tribe decision with City of Boerne v. 
Flores,66 which held that Congress could not statutorily expand rights 
founded in the Constitution beyond what the Court had declared 
them to be, nor could it create remedies out of proportion to a dem-
onstrated record of Fourteenth Amendment violations.67 
After City of Boerne, the Court invalidated Congress’s attempt to 
make states liable for damages in a number of statutes, holding that 
they did not enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.68  Two of these were 
employment discrimination laws.  In Kimel v. Florida Board of Re-
gents,69 the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act70 was neither congruent nor proportional to any documented pat-
tern of constitutional violations by states;71 it held the same thing for 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act72 in Board of Trustees v. 
Garrett.73  While the Court upheld the family leave provisions of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act as properly enforcing the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-66 (1996).  The Court revised that limitation in 
two bankruptcy cases, Central Virginia Community College v. Katz and Tennessee Student Assis-
tance Corp. v. Hood, holding that Congress could subject the state to suit in bankruptcy proceed-
ings under its Article I bankruptcy powers.  Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373-79 
(2006); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446-51 (2004). 
 65 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976). 
 66 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 67 Id. at 517, 519-20, 536  (holding that, while Congress has broad authority under the 
Constitution to adopt legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court retains the 
right to determine whether such legislation amounts to an abuse of authority under the Constitu-
tion).  
 68 For instance, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education & Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education & Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), the Court held that the Patent and Plant Vari-
ety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992), and the 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1114, 1122, 1125, 1127 (1994), were not 
valid enactments under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. & Ex-
pense Bd., 527 U.S. at 647 (involving the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarifica-
tion Act); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 690-91 (involving the Trademark Remedy Clarification 
Act). 
 69 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 70 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006). 
 71 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 63. 
 72 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-117 (2006). 
 73 Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).  The Court upheld Title II of the 
ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2006), which requires government bodies to provide access to 
government buildings and services to those with disabilities, at least in cases where the plaintiff 
was denied access to the courts or suffered cruel and unusual punishment, both constitutional 
violations in their own right.  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 509-10, 515, 523 (2004). 
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Amendment,74 it held that the self-care provisions did not enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment.75 
Outside of the intersection of the Fourteenth and Eleventh 
Amendments, the Court has also taken a restrictive view of federal 
power in other civil rights contexts: habeas corpus jurisdiction,76 voting 
rights cases,77 and implied rights of action directly under the Constitu-
tion.78  The Court also seems to have narrowed the definition of dis-
crimination, diminishing the possibility of using the disparate impact 
theory under Title VII,79 and rejecting the possibility that evidence of 
implicit biases could be evidence of either disparate impact or dispa-
rate treatment.80  
IV. THE NEWEST TRENDS – CUTTING OFF HOPE ENTIRELY? 
In addition to these trends, even more troubling trends are sug-
gested by what the Court is not addressing in some of its decisions and 
what individual justices are saying in concurrences and dissents.  This 
section explores some of those trends. 
The Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano81 is one such case.  At 
issue in Ricci was whether a city government’s rejection of results 
from a test for promotion that caused a disparate impact on firefight-
ers of color was disparate treatment, and if so, whether the city could 
defend its actions on the grounds that it was avoiding liability for the 
disparate impact.82  Because the employer was a city government, the 
Equal Protection clause also applied to it, and the firefighters who 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Nev. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 722-24 (2003). 
 75 Coleman v. Ct. App. Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333-37 (2012).  Justice Scalia, concurring, 
would have held that outside of race, Congress’s enforcement power is limited to regulating 
conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer would overrule Seminole Tribe and hold that Congress may validly 
abrogate state immunity from suit under its Commerce Clause powers.  Id. at 1339 & n.1 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). 
 76 E.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995) (expressing concern that habeas filings 
threatened the finality of state court judgments, implicating comity and federalism), superseded 
by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (2006). 
 77 E.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 476–85 (1996) (holding that preclear-
ance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994), cannot be denied 
simply because a jurisdiction’s voting procedures violate Section 2 of the Act, id. § 1973); Growe 
v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (recognizing that, even though federal and state courts may 
have concurrent jurisdiction over particular subject matter, there are circumstances in which 
federalism and comity concerns dictate federal abstention).  But see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 
1069 (1996) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality opinion for going too 
far in limiting state discretion under the Voting Rights Act). 
 78 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 680-82 (2009). 
 79 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).  
 80 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-55 (2011). 
 81 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 557. 
 82 Id. at 578-81. 
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sued the city argued that rejecting the results violated both Title VII 
and the Equal Protection clause.83  The majority found that the city’s 
rejection of the results was disparate treatment under Title VII, declin-
ing to reach the equal protection issue.84 
Justice Scalia concurred that the City of New Haven’s decision to 
not certify a promotion list was because of the race of the successful 
applicants, but he wrote separately to say that he believed the Court 
would have to decide one day whether the disparate impact provisions 
of Title VII violate equal protection.85  Title VII prohibits employers 
from using neutral practices that have a disparate impact on members 
of a protected group unless those practices are job related and consis-
tent with business necessity.86  To comply with the prohibition on dis-
parate impact, employers have to look at the race, sex, or other iden-
tity characteristics of the members of its work force and compare the 
proportions of each group to their proportions in the labor pool.87  
They must consider the race of employees and take particular actions 
because of the race of successful candidates.88 Additionally, the duty to 
act based on the protected class of the employees does not depend on 
prior discrimination by that employer the way that it might under the 
Equal Protection clause.89 
Asking whether there has been a disparate impact and rejecting 
the neutral practice that produced it, in Justice Scalia’s view, was a 
consideration of protected class in which the federal government 
would not be able to engage while remaining consistent with the equal 
protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment.90  And if 
Congress cannot do it, Congress should not be able to require private 
employers to do it.  Justice Scalia did not bring up the issue in the next 
case to present a disparate impact claim, this one in the private sector; 
in fact, he did not address that theory of discrimination at all in his 
opinion.91 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See id. at 561-63, 576-77, 592-93. 
 84 Id. at 576-77, 592-93. 
 85 Id. at 594-95 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 86 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006). 
 87 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing the disparate impact 
cause of action); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (refining the 
calculations in light of the relevant labor pool), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated 
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011).  
 88 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (defining the burden of proof in disparate impact cases 
and making clear that the employer will be liable if the challenged practice causes a disparate 
impact but is not consistent with a business necessity). 
 89 E.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (recognizing that remedying past 
discrimination was a compelling governmental interest). 
 90 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 594-95 (2009). 
 91 Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552-57 (2011). 
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That case, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, had other troubling aspects.92  The 
case involved whether all of the women who had worked for Wal-
Mart since 1998 could proceed as a class in a case involving sex dis-
crimination in pay and promotions.93  The class certification was over-
turned as not satisfying the class action rules.94  Along the way, Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected social science evidence on 
how implicit biases could infect a corporate culture and promote dis-
criminatory sex stereotyping.  He found the claim that people tend to 
make choices infected by stereotypes not believable based on how he 
believed people would act.95  In essence, Justice Scalia seems to have 
held that employers will be liable for discrimination only when their 
agents are motivated to treat employees in a particular way because 
the employees are members of a protected class, and those agents 
fully realize that this is their motivation.96  Ricci and Wal-Mart suggest 
that Congress cannot prohibit inequitable effects. 
Justice Scalia is not the only Justice who is skeptical that dis-
crimination still exists and of Congress’s ability to enact prophylactic 
rules that grant rights greater than what the Constitution provides.  
Justice Thomas, too, is skeptical.  He would have held that the pre-
clearance provision of the Voting Rights Act exceeded Congress’s 
power in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. 
Holder.97  The majority avoided deciding the issue,98 but it is back at the 
Supreme Court in the current term.99 
With every contraction of rights by the Court, scholars and activ-
ists retrenched at two safety nets: the Ex Parte Young doctrine,100 and 
the Spending Clause.101  First, let me explain the Ex Parte Young safety 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 2556-67. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 2553-55. 
 96 See Marcia L. McCormick, Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the Future of 
Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1401 (2013). 
 97 557 U.S. 193, 215-82 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The 
amendment at issue was the Fifteenth, which specifically concerns voting. 
 98 Id. at 201-06. 
 99 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-06.  Justice Scalia demonstrated his skepticism about the 
validity of this part of the Voting Rights Act, calling it a “racial entitlement.”  Oral Argument 
Transcript, at 47, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-06 (Feb. 27, 2013).  At the time this article went to 
press, the third week in June, the Court had still not issued its decision in the case. 
 100 See, e.g., Rochelle Bobroff, Ex Parte Young as a Tool to Enforce Safety-Net and Civil-
Rights Statutes, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 819 (2009); Bruce E. O’Connor & Emily C. Peyser, Ex Parte 
Young: A Mechanism for Enforcing Federal Intellectual Property Rights against States, 10 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 225 (2004). 
 101 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“Congress is free to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual 
basis with the States if it wishes.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
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net.  When the Court said that states could not be sued for damages 
under statutes that Congress created, it removed only that remedy.  
The states still had to comply with the statutes as long as they were 
valid commerce clause legislation.  And the way that individuals could 
force compliance was by bringing an action against a state actor seek-
ing prospective relief for the state to comply with the statute in the 
future.  Under Ex Parte Young, such an action is not viewed as a suit 
against the state, which would be barred by sovereign immunity.102  
Now, let me explain why the Spending Clause seemed to provide some 
relief.  Because Congress had more power to spend federal money for 
the general welfare than it had even to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause, it could impose conditions – like complying with anti-
discrimination laws or even engaging in affirmative action – on those 
funds before they were accepted as long as those conditions were not 
coercive.103  However, two additional cases from the Court’s 2012 term 
suggest that these safety nets are in danger, as well. 
In Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 
the Supreme Court had to decide whether a private action could be 
brought against state officials directly under the Supremacy Clause 
using the Ex Parte Young implied right of action.104  The majority 
dodged the question,105 but four justices would have said no.106 Those 
dissenters would have limited Ex Parte Young even more fundamen-
tally to essentially not apply to spending clause legislation at all, and 
to rarely apply to commerce clause legislation unless it provided a 
private right of action explicitly.107  If this view were to command a 
majority of the Court, it is possible that the Spending Clause will be-
come less available, and it may also signal that the Court will limit Ex 
Parte Young in other ways.  
The Court has limited the doctrine before.  It was refined in 
Edelman v. Jordan, in which the Court held that the exception to state 
immunity only applied when plaintiffs were seeking prospective re-
lief.108  In a later case, the Court held that the federal courts may not 
hear claims for relief based on alleged violations of state law,109 and 
                                                                                                                           
 102 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 103 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203, 206 (1987). 
 104 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).  
 105 Id. at 1210-11. 
 106 See id. at 1211-15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 107 See id.; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Douglas and the Fate of Ex Parte Young, 122 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 13 (2012), available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-
part/supreme-court/douglas-and-the-fate-of-ex-parte-young/. 
 108 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 109 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
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may not exercise jurisdiction when Congress has created an extensive 
alternative enforcement scheme.110  Finally, the doctrine cannot be 
used to sue state officials to quiet title to lands possibly within the ter-
ritory of the state.111  This latest round in the Ex Parte Young line of 
cases suggests that the Court may be likely to impose even more 
stringent limitations in the future. 
In National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,112 the 
Court also suggested that new limits to Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause may be in the works.  The Court held that the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid was too 
coercive to be within Congress’s Spending Clause powers.113  While 
Justice Roberts appeared to agree that Congress could have repealed 
Medicaid and replaced it with a different program that accomplished 
the Medicaid expansion, he rejected the significance of that fact: 
[I]t would certainly not be that easy.  Practical constraints would 
plainly inhibit, if not preclude, the Federal Government from re-
pealing the existing program and putting every feature of Medi-
caid on the table for political reconsideration.  Such a massive 
undertaking would hardly be “ritualistic.”114 
Justice Roberts’ opinion seems to have implicitly accepted that 
Congress could, alternatively, create a wholly federal program under 
the Spending Clause, but it also implied that Congress could not re-
peal Medicaid unless it was going to replace it with a federal pro-
gram.115  If the Court is set to reign in Congress’s powers under the 
Spending Clause, many important workplace programs might be in 
                                                                                                                           
 110 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).  In an analogous case, the Court has 
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be used to sue state actors for violations of statutes that contain 
comprehensive enforcement schemes.  See Middlesex Cty. Sewage Authority v. Nat’l Sea Clam-
mers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 111 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287 (1997) (concerning the title to sub-
merged lands).  This may be a very narrow exception applicable only to disputes between states 
and Indian tribes over the territorial boundaries of both.  This context is one of the few land 
disputes that could raise a federal question, namely where land was reserved through a federal 
treaty with a tribe. 
 112 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 113 Id. at 2633-39 (Roberts, C.J.).  Only Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in this part of the 
opinion.  Ordinarily, the opinion of three Justices within a majority would not be controlling.  
However, once the four Justices who dissented entirely are counted, there are seven Justices who 
believed that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional for one reason or another.  Id. at 
2656-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Conversely, only two Justices believed that the Medicaid expan-
sion was constitutional.  Id. at 2609, 2629-42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 114 Id. at 2606 n.14 (Roberts, C.J.). 
 115 See id. at 2661-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the scope of the Medicaid program 
and states’ reliance on it). 
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danger, and Congress’s toolbox to address the gender gap will be 
much more poorly equipped. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GENDER GAP 
The actual and potential limitations discussed in the preceding 
section pose especially serious problems for addressing the gender gap 
through law.  Research has demonstrated that antidiscrimination pro-
visions and family friendly policies cannot reduce the gap significantly 
by themselves: they fall victim to the equal rights/special rights prob-
lem.116  Formal equality principles, equality of rights or equal opportu-
nity, have not been successful because men and women are not con-
sidered to be the same, either because of biological differences or be-
cause of how people are acculturated to perform their gender.  Over-
all, we have not progressed very far in addressing inequality in con-
texts where we think people are different.   
In the law, formal equality or equal rights usually refers either to 
the absence of classification or to a mandate not to classify on the ba-
sis of membership in a particular group.  Formal equality is focused on 
the individual rather than on the group that the individual may be a 
member of.  Formal equality is nothing more or less than the Aristote-
lian principle that likes should be treated alike while those who are 
not alike should be treated differently.  An alternate approach to 
equality is substantive equality or equality of outcomes or results.  
Substantive equality generally refers to equality in the distribution of 
goods, resources, and power, and is often described as embodying an 
anti-subordination principle.  This anti-subordination principle pro-
vides that actions enforcing the inferior status of historically op-
pressed groups should be prohibited.  
The formal equality approach, at least to some extent, retains his-
torical inequities.  It prohibits different pay within an occupation if 
that difference is because of the sex of the worker, but it accepts just 
about any other reason for that difference in pay, without requiring 
the employer to justify its reason.  It accepts that all nurses should be 
paid the same basic wage, but accepts that firefighters should be paid 
more.  To the extent that the gender gap is caused by occupational 
segregation, by choices and human capital investments that women 
make, or by cognitive biases of employers or women themselves, as 
long as Congress’s power is limited to the tools of formal equality, 
there seems little Congressional power that can reach the gap. 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See, e.g., Evans, supra note 14 (describing how work/family reconciliation policies – leave 
policies – exacerbated gender segregation in the labor market and a pay and promotions gap; 
and summarizing prior research reaching the same conclusions). 
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Formal equality tends to view social goods as fixed resources in a 
closed system.  In a closed system with scarce resources, every alloca-
tion decision is a zero-sum game.  To give to one person is to take 
away from another, and when group identity status is mixed in, things 
get more complicated.  Giving something to women looks like taking 
something away from men. The distribution of resources and social 
goods appears natural, and advantages are invisible, at least to those 
who have them.  Even small changes in how resources should be allo-
cated may look like they injure “rights” of members of the dominant 
group. 
The one power that may be left open to Congress, the one power 
we actually use to redistribute wealth and income, seems to be the 
taxing power.117  And so maybe this is the direction we should begin to 
focus on.  Perhaps we could tax occupations at different rates, creating 
a tax incentive for people who work in fields that are integrated or 
that are dominated by members of another sex.  Maybe we could tie 
corporate income tax rates to the level of vertical integration in a firm 
or the integration of its workforce across jobs.  Perhaps investment 
income from companies that have integrated across job categories 
could be taxed at a lower rate than income from companies that have 
not.  Maybe we could provide other tax-expenditure incentives for 
employers that could reduce either occupational segregation or the 
lower pay linked with pink collar jobs. There may be very good policy 
reasons not to use the taxing power in this way, reasonable minds can 
differ.  But if the only power left open for government to take a role in 
promoting equality is the taxing power, perhaps we should explore it; 
that may be our future. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 117 At least one other scholar has come to the same conclusion.  Linda Sugin, The Great 
and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has Reduced Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and 
Tax Expenditures (unpublished manuscript 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2183278. 
